Off the bat, anyone parading with their drug use is either a desperate has-been or a total loser who records everyone without their consent. As for the relic "sex, drugs and go fuck yourself", if you need drugs to have sex or rock and roll, then you do need to see a doctor.


There are many ways to be the wrong side of history:

One way is to stick to the out-dated view that only a “work” merits legislative protection while the various components of a work don't, and to make things even more interesting, cite CCH v. LSUC (which deals with fair use through a library photocopier!!!), in order to contend that private information accessed and subjected to reproductive processes should not be construed as property.

Each and every fragment of data may not be a “work” per se (and we shouldn't really care if it is), but when it is accessed and used through copyright relevant processes, such as extraction and reproduction, then information is being normalized and copyright-protected use takes place.

Having just read the amended directive adopted by the European Parliament, I’m glad to note that section 8(a) rejoins the current trend in the air of why privacy data should be treated like copyrighted material. And why users should get royalties for the exploitation of their data. This is not even the controversial part of the directive.

Whoever decided to rewrite my grounds for appeal last October 24 and ask the intelligent question of whether private sound obtained without a warrant is a “work” (I couldn’t have come up with such a question, even if I tried really, really hard), here is the answer: it doesn’t have to be. Completely immaterial question, because it implies without providing any justification that unlawfully accessed content, unlawfully subjected to reproductive processes, has to undergo a “work” analysis on a fragment basis.

Is a movie a work? Damn right it is. Is the producer of the sound track the author of the movie? Most likely not. Does he/she/it have copyright in the recording? Yes, and it is separate from the movie, but once it is in the movie, it becomes the movie, therefore a “work”. I am not making this up.

Is a choreography a work or simply performer’s performance or both? What about a filmed choreography. Which one is the work, the film or the choreo? Some say, if you can see it on a screen and it moves, it is cinematographic work. Sure. But for a choreo to be recognized as a work, it has to be fixed. How do you fix a sequence of dance movements to be performed by a human? Do you draw little humans, making moves, in a sketchbook or you rather hire a human, show her the moves, film the moves? Maybe buy yourself a tripod, kick your own butt, and put the moves on film? Does the choreographic work disappear in the movie, because everything that’s filmed is automatically a cinematographic work?

I could go on and on, but I didn’t write the statutes, so I wish everyone the best of luck with Canadian copyright and privacy provisions.

The Product

I am working on a cinematographic work to document some super important stuff that happened over the past 3 years through the lens of two failed appeals. Why appeals? For the transcripts that are already paid for. I noticed that the only time anyone will read a transcript is when passages are posted online. Posting transcripts is the beginning of a multi-platform documentary.

Commercial Interest Argument by on Scribd

Think Ancient Aliens (for its flow and tempo and how you prove that aliens exist, a show already in its teens) meets the Blasey/Kavanaugh senate hearing (most riveting multi-platform tv reality week of all history from hearing itself to man in elevator to final vote).

From this one case, I intend to expand on a format franchise for another dozen cases from coast to coast. I will spare the public all the boring details of trials (a full case episode will last maximum one hour), to focus on the lowest common denominator, sex and credibility.

The latest trend, setting up crowd-funding escrow accounts for victims of the system will be part of the format.

Credibility idol, Overestimating The Scope of Sex

96 minutes of unauthorized recordings of a vocal performance accomplished through intrusion upon the author's seclusion for the purpose of mixing sex samples into a commercial song.

According to Canadian Courts, the author's sexuality is a valid defense to copyright infringement, based on evidence of intimate emails between the parties. Stoyanova c. Les Disques Mile End, 2018 QCCA 1788

[15]        La juge s’appuie à cet égard sur les courriels échangés par les parties les 10 juin 2010, 2 et 3 août 2010, pour conclure que leur relation hautement sexualisée a mené Maranda à croire de manière honnête qu’elle ne s’opposerait pas à l’enregistrement et à la création de la version intime de l’œuvre (intégrant le cri de jouissance)[5]. Or, l’appelante ne fait pas voir en quoi son analyse du caractère intentionnel des gestes posés par Maranda serait différente sous l’angle de la violation du droit d’auteur. (citation jugement Cour d’appel « Stoyanova c. Disques Mile End Inc. »

How the defense of a gratuitous, implicit license survived summary judgment in 2013. Stoyanova c. Les Disques Mile End, 2013 QCCS 5631

(A) Does the implicit licence defense to a commercial infringement claim, absent any contract, and based on the author's sexuality, constitute sexual harassment in the course of proceedings?

(B) Does a party who defends a co-defendant's infringement in judicial proceedings thereby authorize co-defendant's infringement?

(C) Is the introduction of rape myths into an IP case a valid criteria in the evaluation of infringement and privacy invasion damages?


Croyance sincère dans la sexualité libérale des auteurs/interprètes by on Scribd

Other than providing the best defense ever for tech giants’ privacy data commercial deals (since it is easier to "overestimate" the scope of a written contract consented to by a user, than is the scope of silence), this is the first IP case to have successfully imported rape myths as a defense to infringement damages.

There was the famous Cinar case from 2009, in which a male plaintiff alleged having felt like a “raped woman” as a result of copyright infringement and got awarded $400,000 in non-pecuniary damages + half a million in punitive. There was not a shred of evidence the male plaintiff experienced any of the classic non-pecuniary consequences of rape: trauma, humiliation, stigma, oppressive silence, fear of not being believed… not a word on these. At the same time, no raped woman in Quebec has ever been awarded more than a 100,000$ in non-pecuniary damages. In sum, sex references generally boost male credibility and impeach female credibility.

I use the terms "woman" and "female" to include all non-hetero + gender-nonconforming victims, who are subjected to these inequalities in our justice system.

How do rape myths translate into intellectual property (or selling data, if you want) :

(1) The « real rape » stereotype : not filing a complaint immediately is ground for impeachment

Translated into IP: you have to send a “lettre de mise en demeure” in the 30 days of discovery of infringement. Otherwise it is a bar to non-pecuniary damages. If something weird of sexual nature involving you and your work has been brought to your attention, remaining calm while trying to figure out how to deal with it is ground for impeachment. Unless you make a scene right away, get the whole thing on film, and immediately send "mise en demeure", you will be impeached.

In Quebec, the 3 year statute of limitations doesn’t seem to apply to women considered “unchaste”. In comparison, there is no statute of limitations for sexual misconduct, battery or assault in intimate relationships in Ontario Civpro.

(1.2) Silence = joy and consent

Translated into IP damages: you lose all right to compensation if you don’t send mise en demeure in the 30 days of damaging event

(2) Sexualizing survivors, focus on history and character of complainant as part of concerted attempt to discredit her

Translated into IP: if you ever had sex in your life, it means you are immune to pain and suffering. Forget non-pecuniary damages.

(3) Smiling = implicit consent to sex; not smiling = not feminine = hysteric Translated into IP and privacy: A woman who smiles, automatically approves non-consensual recordings that will be brought to her knowledge years later. A woman who doesn’t smile is a “crisse de folle”.

(4) Women make false allegations about rape Translated into IP and privacy: la femme qui dit NON a une « propension de déformer la réalité »

(5) Women who sue in civil suits are “greedy”. If you bring a case, you’re a shameless woman, whence the slut-shaming.

Female performers and authors are expected to work for free. Rape myths trump collective agreements. Mile End Records' case is the living proof of that. Not one judgment acknowledges that the label signed a collective agreement, expressly promising the union to pay artists and to ask for their written consent, not their forgettable ex-boyfriends' consent, but the artist's.

The first thing the Union des artistes did in 2012 when I needed an injunction is to simply throw me out of the union. I still have their ultimatum letter: "you either go back to work, or you're out of the union". I was like, dude I'm in 600 stores around the world and I'm not being paid. You want me to keep working for nothing. To them it wasn't work because their producer didn't sign a recording contract. And since they have no jurisdiction over international commerce and invasion of privacy, they barred me from ever working again in the province of Quebec.

(6) A man can consent for a woman, the burden of proof is on her to show absence of consent to every 3rd party who alleges her consent.

IP: self-explanatory and in total contradiction with s. 13, CRA The less she knows, the more she consents, the less harm she suffers. Forget about balance of probabilities in civil proceedings. Burden of proof is different for women.

Because of pervasive rape myths in civil proceedings, you will always be judged on an inflated burden of proof.

In conclusion, I may be wrong, but after 6 years of litigation (which should’ve been over in 6 months, weren't it for myths), I am under the impression that in QC there seems to be a deficit in understanding of traditional property rules, in particular conveyances of land and future interests, which are the foundation for all IP legislation. Unless you work in tech or entertainment, or carry historical land trouble in your blood, you may never appreciate the true power of IP. It is like trying to paint abstract art, before you learn how to paint a recognizable horse. A mediocre mess.

Historique des procédures en deuxième instance:

Tableau de plaido, 24 octob... by on Scribd

Cahier de sources, Cour d&#... by on Scribd

Je suis, je ne suis pas, mais je me sens dans l'obligation de...

Stoyanova c. Les Disques Mile End 24-octobre-2018 Expose de la partie appelante

Memoire Cour d'appel Volume 1

Volume 2 transcriptions

Jugement sur Requête de Nicolas Maranda en rejet d’appel (Articles 365 et 366 C.p.c. et 32 R.p.c.)

Injunction, Stoyanova v. Mile End Records, Oct 26, 2012

"mix et remix sont partis en bâteau, mix tombe à l'eau, qui reste?"