Dans l'affaire de la faillite de: Les Disques Mile End Inc

Représentations du 25 février 2019, Cour supérieure

A. L'actif de la faillite

B. L'évaluation de l'actif

C. La continuation du commerce de la débitrice

D. Le paragraphe 83(2) Loi sur la faillite et insolvabilité

E. Le paragraphe 83(3) Loi sur la faillite et insolvabilité

F. L'abandon de l'actif dans le commerce

G. La distribution de l'actif entre les créanciers

H. Est-il trop tard pour transiger sur l'actif?

Réprésentations écrites, ré... by on Scribd

Audience du 13 février 2019:

Abandonner un actif de propriété intellectuelle qui est dans le commerce à la date de la faillite équivaut à sa disposition à titre gratuit en contravention totale à l'article 83(2), sans le consentement des auteurs et des artistes, ce qui porte irrémédiablement atteinte aux droits de plusieurs centaines auteurs et artistes, leur niant la protection que leur garantit l'article 83. Le syndic est dorénavant personnellement responsable de tous les dommages subis par ces centaines d'artistes et auteurs à cause du non-respect délibéré de l'article 83.

BSF (OCR Binder, 204 pages)... by on Scribd

C'est la première faillite corporative au Canada, dans laquelle un actif de propriété intellectuelle consistant en182 albums, 741 bandes sonores et leurs copies numériques et remixes d'une valeur marchande de plus de 220 000$, dans le commerce au sens de l'art. 83(2), Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité depuis la date de la faillite et jusqu’à ce jour (Pièce - P-1), a été "abandonné" en faveur d'une personne liée à la débitrice.

Communiquez, Ne Communiquez... by on Scribd

Le moment est venu de tester l'art. 40, LFI versus les exigences du paragraphe 83(2), LFI, sans oublier le droit de premier refus des auteurs de l'art. 83(3) et les deux décisions de la Cour d'appel dans le dossier civil: (i) celle de février 2015 qui nous parle de la console d'exploitation des titres (cet "outil de travail" qui est présentement dans la saisine du syndic et par laquelle celui-ci contrôle l'exploitation commerciale mondiale), et (ii) la décision d'octobre 2018 qui qualifie la débitrice de producteur.

Alternativement, si le syndic n'a pas accès aux livres de Disques Mile End et qu'il n'a jamais eu le contrôle sur l'actif, il n'y a jamais eu de faillite (whichever you prefer)

Le dossier civil

Croyance sincère dans la sexualité libérale des auteurs/interprètes by on Scribd

Le 24 octobre 2018, la Cour d'appel a mis fin à la controverse quant à l'identité du producteur des enregistrements sonores du 10 juin 2010 et du 14 juillet 2010 qui ont servi à la confection des 10 remixes non autorisés de l'oeuvre musicale Bonboni. La Cour d'appel a confirmé que Les Disques Mile End (présentement exploitée sous le nom Griffintown Records par le syndic à la faillite Litwin Boyadjian Inc ) est le producteur et non pas une licenciée exclusive sur le droit de reproduction dans ces enregistrements, comme l'avait conclu la Cour supérieure au paragraphe 58 du jugement de première instance ( Stoyanova c. Les Disques Mile End 24-octobre-2018 500-09-026471-169 Arrêt).

Malgré son adhésion à l'Entente collective du phonogramme, le producteur a réalisé les séances d'enregistrement sans contrat et sans cachet à la résidence privée d'un musicien indépendant dans une "ambiance sex, drugs, and rock and roll" avec prise subreptice de photos intimes de l'artiste-interprète, ce pour quoi le musicien a été rémunéré, mais pas l'interprète.

Validé par les tribunaux québécois, ce modèle économique compromet tout espoir d'équité salariale dans l'industrie du divertissement et expose la différence de traitement des justiciables sur la base du sexe.

(A) Est-ce que la défense de la licence implicite à la commercialisation d’une chanson, sans contrat et sur la seule base de la sexualisation de l’auteur interprète, constitue de l’harcèlement sexuel en cours d’instance et un abus de procédure?

(B) En ayant défendu cœur et âme la contrefaçon des Disques Mile End à l’instruction, l’intimé Nicolas Maranda a-t-il autorisé cette contrefaçon de manière illicite et intentionnelle? Si oui, est-il solidairement responsable des conséquences pécuniaires de la contrefaçon?

(C) Est-ce que l’introduction des «mythes du viol » dans un dossier de propriété intellectuelle et les perceptions rétrogrades sur la sexualité féminine ont eu pour effet de supprimer les conséquences non pécuniaires de la commercialisation de l’œuvre et le caractère intentionnel de l'atteinte à la vie privée de l’auteur interprète?

Commercial Interest Argument by on Scribd

Credibility idol, overestimating the scope of silence

Other than providing the best defense ever for tech giants’ privacy data commercial deals (since it is easier to "overestimate" the scope of a written contract consented to by a user, than is the scope of silence), this is the first IP case to have successfully imported rape myths as a defense to infringement damages.

There was the famous Cinar case from 2009, in which a male plaintiff alleged having felt like a “raped woman” as a result of copyright infringement and got awarded $400 000 in non-pecuniary damages + half a million in punitive. There was not a shred of evidence the male plaintiff experienced any of the classic non-pecuniary consequences of rape: trauma, humiliation, stigma, oppressive silence, fear of not being believed… not a word on these. At the same time, no raped woman in Quebec has ever been awarded more than a 100 000$ in non-pecuniary damages. In sum, sex references generally boost male credibility and impeach female credibility.

I use the terms "woman" and "female" to include all non-hetero + gender-nonconforming victims, who are subjected to these inequalities in our justice system.

As for the tort of privacy invasion, in BC and ON, the intrusion upon seclusion part is codified as a statutory offence, where no proof of damages is required and intent is understood in narrow terms, as wanting to bring about the violation of privacy.

In QC, strange as it may seem, privacy invasion is dealt with in negligence terms (it’s so super weird, I know). Maybe it is because there is only one section that deals with civil liability, where they threw in the reasonable person, but there is no clear distinction between intentional torts and negligence. It is total chaos. Nobody seems to know what intent is, because systematically intent is assimilated to malice (absent any allegations of malice). Bottom line is, proof of damages is required, in order to prove intrusion upon seclusion.

In my case, it went even further, damages were slashed because one defendant felt “defamed” by the proceedings and went on to “denounce” the defamation on social media in order to instigate a defamation lawsuit (Court of Appeal final at para. 28)! Not very original because in QC everybody feels defamed, especially if they’re being sued. This is the most hyper-sensitive to speech state in the world. The first thing I learned by heart before ever going to law school is all the defenses to defamation. What’s bizarre is when a defendant’s self-esteem issues become a valid defense to IP infringement and invasion of privacy.

Even absent any allegations of rape, sex based stereotypes are accepted as valid defenses to IP infringement and invasion of privacy. The implicit bias that non-chaste women are liars runs so deep that it frequently manifests as medieval forms of “victim blaming”.

How do rape myths translate into intellectual property (or selling data, if you want) :

(1) The « real rape » stereotype : not filing a complaint immediately is ground for impeachment

Translated into IP: you have to send a “lettre de mise en demeure” in the 30 days of discovery of infringement. Otherwise it is a bar to non-pecuniary damages. If something weird of sexual nature involving you and your work has been brought to your attention, remaining calm while trying to figure out how to deal with it is ground for impeachment. Unless you make a scene right away, get the whole thing on film, and immediately send "mise en demeure", you will be impeached.

In Quebec, the 3 year statute of limitations doesn’t seem to apply to women considered “unchaste”. In comparison, there is no statute of limitations for sexual misconduct, battery or assault in intimate relationships in Ontario Civpro.

(1.2) Silence = joy and consent

Translated into IP damages: you lose all right to compensation if you don’t send mise en demeure in the 30 days of damaging event

(2) Sexualizing survivors, focus on history and character of complainant as part of concerted attempt to discredit her

Translated into IP: if you ever had sex in your life, it means you are immune to pain and suffering. Forget non-pecuniary damages.

(3) Smiling = implicit consent to sex; not smiling = not feminine = hysteric Translated into IP and privacy: A woman who smiles, automatically approves non-consensual recordings that will be brought to her knowledge years later. A woman who doesn’t smile is a “crisse de folle”.

(4) Women make false allegations about rape Translated into IP and privacy: la femme qui dit NON a une « propension de déformer la réalité »

(5) Women who sue in civil suits are “greedy”. If you bring a case, you’re a shameless woman, whence the slut-shaming.

Female performers and authors are expected to work for free. Rape myths trump collective agreements. Mile End Records' case is the living proof of that. Not one judgment acknowledges that the label signed a collective agreement, expressly promising the union to pay artists and to ask for their written consent, not their forgettable ex-boyfriends' consent, but the artist's.

The first thing the Union des artistes did in 2012 when I needed an injunction is to simply throw me out of the union. For the 2nd time. I still have their ultimatum letter: "you either go back to work, or you're out of the union". I was like, dude I'm in 600 stores around the world and I'm not being paid. You want me to keep working for nothing. How about you do your job and get me my money and the stupid half credits (they do cut credits in two, to make it a little harder on everyone). It was a mutual point of no return.

(6) A man can consent for a woman, the burden of proof is on her to show absence of consent to every 3rd party who alleges her consent.

IP: self-explanatory and in total contradiction with s. 13, CRA The less she knows, the more she consents, the less harm she suffers. Forget about balance of probabilities in civil proceedings. Burden of proof is different for women.

Because of pervasive rape myths in civil proceedings, you will always be judged on an inflated burden of proof.

In conclusion, I may be wrong, but after 6 years of litigation (which should’ve been over in 6 months, were it not for rape myths), I am under the impression that in QC there seems to be a deficit in understanding of traditional property law (especially estates and future interests) which predate IP legislation.

Unless you work in the entertainment or tech industries (and most lawyers don’t), you absolutely need to have a property law background, because IP is more complex (also infinitely more interesting) than land. You can’t sell the same land simultaneously to a gazillion different users a gazillion of number of times. Land is old property. Land is trouble, polluted frac sands, taxes, shakespearean family feuds, dozens of executed ancestors in the hands of Lenin and Stalin (yes, the motherland sucks the most) ... IP on the other hand is poetic key combinations accessing crypto-wallets, IP is sending out a song to 600 stores with a single click, IP is software, encryption, streaming, choreography, plant hybrids, patents, film, user-generated content, alternative currencies, my favorite intent-recognition robot who speaks with my voice, I named her Rhea... and IP is so much more.

And then comes data which should be treated like property. If tech giants want to commercially exploit privacy data, they have to start paying royalties to users.

Historique des procédures en deuxième instance:

Tableau de plaido, 24 octob... by on Scribd

Pursuant to the Canadian Copyright Act, the maker of a sound recording is the person who undertakes the arrangements necessary for the first fixation of the sounds. The trial judge alluded that the corporation Mile End Records is the maker of the sound recordings, but held at the same time that the same corporation was a licensee in the reproduction rights of these recordings, having overestimated the scope of the license on the basis of the artist’s sexual conduct.

On appeal, it was confirmed that the corporation is the maker of the non-consensual recordings regardless of who undertook the arrangements for their first fixation. Since there is a direct connection between the recordings and the maker, there’s also a direct connection between the maker and performer’s performance in these recordings.

A licence given by a 3rd party to the maker to publish, reproduce, rent out these same recordings, and authorize any such acts, would directly contradict the defendant corporation’s ownership in the recordings and its status as their maker.

As the owner of the sole right to copy the recordings pursuant to s. 18, CRA, the maker is the only person who can give authorizations to publish, reproduce, rent out the recordings, and authorize any such acts. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to determine who authorized copies of the recordings on the basis of sexual conduct of artists. All liability for sexual misconduct goes to the corporation.

Since January 2016, the maker’s assets, several hundred sound recordings with significant commercial potential, are being controlled and exploited by the trustee in the bankruptcy, Litwin Boyadjian Inc.

Cahier de sources, Cour d'appel, 24 octobre 2018 (ocr) by Rossita Stoyanhoff on Scribd

Je suis, je ne suis pas, mais je me sens dans l'obligation de...

Stoyanova c. Les Disques Mile End 24-octobre-2018 Expose de la partie appelante

Memoire Cour d'appel Volume 1

Volume 2 transcriptions

Jugement sur Requête de Nicolas Maranda en rejet d’appel (Articles 365 et 366 C.p.c. et 32 R.p.c.)

Injunction, Stoyanova v. Mile End Records, Oct 26, 2012

"mix et remix sont partis en bâteau, mix tombe à l'eau, qui reste?"